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This paper studies the design of experimental trials when outcomes depend signif-
icantly on unobserved effort decisions taken by subjects (agents).1 Even in an ideal 
setting where the experimenter (principal) can randomly and independently assign 
an arbitrarily large number of agents to the treatment and control groups, unob-
served effort limits the informativeness of randomized controlled trials (RCTs). For 
example, if a technology’s measured returns are low, it is difficult to distinguish 
whether this is because true returns are low or because most agents believe they are 
low and therefore expend no effort using the technology. Moreover, to the extent that 
effort responds to beliefs, and beliefs respond to information, this makes it difficult 
to predict the returns to the technology in the same population as it becomes better 
1 Throughout the paper we call experimental subjects agents, and call the experimenter the principal. Following 
usual conventions, we assume the principal is female, and agents are male.
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informed. In other words, unobserved effort is a source of heterogeneity in treatment 
effects, and is a significant challenge to the external validity of experimental trials.2
We propose simple extensions of RCTs—which we call selective trials—that 
improve the external validity of trial results without sacrificing robustness or inter-
nal validity. These experimental designs can be used to determine the extent to 
which erroneous beliefs or inappropriate effort affect measured treatment effects. 
We provide a systematic analysis of trial design using a principal-agent framework 
with both adverse selection—an agent’s type is unobserved—and moral hazard—an 
agent’s effort is unobserved. Unlike the standard principal-agent framework, how-
ever, our principal’s goal is to maximize information about a technology’s returns—
in the sense of Blackwell—rather than profits. The principal seeks to achieve this 
objective through single-agent mechanisms that assign agents to treatments of vary-
ing sophistication based on the message they send.
These mechanisms improve on RCTs for two reasons. First, they let agents 
express preferences over their treatment by probabilistically selecting themselves in 
or out of the treatment group at a cost—hence the name selective trials.3 This makes 
implicit, unobserved selection an explicit part of the experimental design. Second, 
these mechanisms allow for treatments of varying richness: in open trials, treatment 
corresponds to access to the new technology; in blind trials, treatment corresponds 
to an undisclosed allotment of the technology, and information about the probability 
of having been allotted the technology; and in incentivized trials, treatment cor-
responds to access to the technology as well as an incentive or insurance contract 
based on outcomes.
Our results fall into two broad categories. Given a type of treatment (open, blind, 
or incentivized) our first set of results characterize maximally informative mecha-
nisms and examine the sampling patterns such mechanisms induce. We show that 
a mechanism is maximally informative if and only if it identifies an agent’s prefer-
ences over all possible treatment assignments and, given preferences, still assigns 
each agent to the treatment and control group with positive probability. Thus, our 
designs encapsulate the data generated by a standard randomized controlled trial. 
These designs can be implemented in a number of intuitive ways, such as a menu of 
lotteries, or utilizing the design of Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964), referred 
to as the BDM mechanism.
While our main focus is on identification, and thus infinite samples, selective tri-
als may impose sampling costs on experimenters. In particular, sampling patterns do 
not matter when arbitrarily large samples are available, but affect statistical power 
in finite samples. In any mechanism that identifies agents’ preferences in a strictly 
incentive-compatible way, agents with a higher value for the technology must be 
assigned to the treatment group with higher probability, which can reduce statistical 
power. These sampling costs can be reduced, however, by diminishing incentives 
for the truthful reporting of preferences. This allows the experimenter to strike a 
2 Unobserved effort is an issue whether a trial is open—agents know their treatment status—or blind—agents’ 
treatment status is obscured by giving the control group a placebo. See Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer (2008) for a 
more detailed description of RCTs and the external validity issues frequently associated with them.
3 For simplicity, we focus on monetary costs, but selection could also be based on nonmonetary costs. For 
example, agents could choose between lines with different wait times to place themselves into the treatment group 
with different probabilities.
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balance between sampling costs and the precision of the preference data that is 
obtained. As detailed later, these results contribute to recent discussions about the 
usefulness of charging subjects for access to treatment in RCTs (see, for instance, 
Dupas 2009; Cohen and Dupas 2010; or Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro 2010).
Our second class of results characterizes what can be inferred from selective tri-
als, and highlights how they contribute to the ongoing discussion about the exter-
nal validity of field experiments (Deaton 2010; Imbens 2010). By eliciting agents’ 
value for the technology, open selective trials recover the distribution of returns as 
a function of willingness to pay. As a result, open trials provide a simple and robust 
way to recover the marginal treatment effects (MTEs) introduced by Heckman and 
Vytlacil (2005). Identifying MTEs is valuable as they can be used to forecast the 
effect of policies that change accessibility of the technology, such as subsidies. 
MTEs, however, are typically not sufficient to make projections about interventions 
that alter beliefs and effort expenditure, such as informational campaigns.4
Selective trials go beyond MTEs and identify deep parameters by letting agents 
express preferences over richer treatments. Specifically, we consider blind trials, in 
which treatment status is hidden from agents by providing the control group with 
a placebo. This allows the principal to vary the information an agent has about his 
treatment status. This variation can be used to identify the pure effect of treatment 
and effort, the effect of their interaction, and agents’ perceived returns to effort.5 
As blind trials are rarely used in economics—often for want of a convincing, ethi-
cal placebo—we extend the analysis to incentivized selective trials in which agents 
know their treatment status, but receive different transfers conditional on observable 
outcomes. Under mild assumptions, this produces information similar to that pro-
duced by selective blind trials.
This paper contributes primarily to the literature on treatment effects. Most of this 
literature, based on a statistical framework quite different from our principal-agent 
approach, has focused on much simpler effort decisions and the ex post analysis 
of data. Agents are usually viewed as either taking treatment or not (with some 
exceptions: see Jin and Rubin 2008 for a recent example), and more importantly, 
this decision is assumed to be observable, or sufficiently correlated with exogenous 
observable variables (Imbens and Angrist 1994; Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996; 
Heckman and Vytlacil 2005). In contrast, we consider effort decisions that are unob-
servable and have high dimensionality. Additionally, most previous approaches, even 
those that rely—as we do—on decision theory, focus on modeling data from an RCT 
4 In addition, selective trials may alleviate subversions of experimental protocol discussed in Deaton (2010). 
That is, explicitly allowing the agents to select themselves in and out of treatment may reduce the number of agents 
in the control group who obtain the treatment by other means, as well as the number of agents in the treatment 
group that refuse to be treated. Furthermore, the principal may use the information revealed by agents’ preferences 
to increase monitoring of agents who expressed a high value for treatment but were assigned to the control group. 
Malani (2008) proposes a related solution: a trial design in which agents may select the nature of their control treat-
ment, thus reducing incentives to subvert the experimental protocol.
5 Although uncommon in economics, blind trials are quite common in medicine. For a brief review of RCTs 
in medicine, see Stolberg, Norman, and Trop (2004). Jadad and Enkin (2007) provides a more comprehensive 
review. Selective trials nest a class of trial designs referred to as preference trials, in which at least one group of 
agents is allowed to choose their treatment. These designs have primarily been used in medicine to understand the 
ethics of randomized controlled trials and facilitate informed consent. Our work shows that eliciting preferences is 
not incompatible with randomization, and that preferences carry information that facilitates inference from treat-
ment effects. For more on preference trials, see Zelen (1979); Flood et al. (1996); Silverman and Altman (1996); 
King et al. (2005); Jadad and Enkin (2007); and Tilbrook (2008).
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after it has been run (Philipson and Desimone 1997; Philipson and Hedges 1998).6 
We take an ex ante perspective and propose designs for experimental trials that can 
help understand how beliefs and effort affect treatment effects.
Successful implementation of the trial designs suggested by our principal-agent 
approach requires addressing a number of challenges. A practical limitation of our 
approach is that large samples may be needed to estimate all identifiable parameters. 
This limitation is inherent in any nonparametric estimation of treatment effects con-
ditional on a large set of explanatory variables (see, for example, Pagan and Ullah 
1999). Another challenge is how to extract reliable preference data from agents. 
Mechanisms that are equivalent in theory, due to the assumption of rationality, may 
have very different properties in practice. Thus, experimenters may prefer to elicit 
coarser preference information in order to use simpler designs. We believe that these 
practical concerns are best resolved through a mix of laboratory and field experi-
ments in well-understood environments. Therefore, it is encouraging that many ele-
ments of selective trials have been evaluated in field settings (see, for example, 
Karlan and Zinman 2009; Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro 2010; Cohen and Dupas 2010; 
Berry, Fischer, and Guiteras 2012). A final set of challenges are more theoretical, 
and deal with extending our mechanisms to elicit richer information, such as the 
variation of preferences over time, or beliefs about other participants.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I uses a simple example to illustrate 
the main points of the paper. Section II defines the general framework. Section III 
investigates open selective trials. Section IV turns to blind selective trials, and shows 
how they can be used to identify true and perceived returns to effort. Section V ana-
lyzes incentivized trials, which eschew placebos, and shows that under reasonable 
assumptions they can be as informative as blind selective trials. Section VI con-
cludes with a discussion of the limitations of, and future directions for, our approach 
to designing randomized controlled experiments.
I. An Example
To illustrate the basic insights underlying selective trials, and the potential useful-
ness of the data they generate, this section adopts a particularly simple model of the 
relationships between agents’ beliefs, effort decisions, and outcomes. We empha-
size that this structure makes inference particularly stark. Subsequent sections study 
inference in a much more general model that incorporates many important aspects 
of actual experiments.
To fix ideas, we discuss the example in terms of an experiment evaluating the 
health effects of a water treatment product.7
6 These studies use information correlated with agents’ decisions to comply or not comply with their assigned 
treatments to refine understanding of treatment effects. This approach, as well as ours, is closely related to the 
classic Roy (1951) selection model in which selection into treatment reveals information about an agent’s type 
(Heckman and Honoré 1990; Heckman, Smith, and Clements 1997).
7 It should be noted that while our main focus is on the use of RCTs in medical, public health, and development 
contexts, our analysis applies to most environments involving decentralized experimentation. For instance, if a 
firm wants to try a new way to organize production, specific plant managers will have to decide how much effort to 
expend implementing it. The firm’s CEO is in the same position as the principal in our framework, and must guess 
the effort expended by his managers when evaluating returns to the new production scheme. Similarly, if a school 
board wants to experiment with a new program, individual teachers and administrators will have to decide how 
much effort to expend on implementing the program.
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A. A Simple Model
There are infinitely many agents indexed by i ∈ 핅. Each agent has a treatment 
status  τ i ∈ {0, 1}. If  τ i = 1 agent i is in the treatment group, and is given the water 
treatment product. Otherwise,  τ i = 0, and the agent is in the control group.
Agent i obtains a final outcome  y i ∈ {0, 1} that can be measured by the principal. 
In our example,  y i = 1 indicates that the agent has remained healthy. The probability 
that an agent remains healthy depends on both treatment and effort:
 Prob( y i = 1 |  e i ,  τ i ) =  q 0 + R e i  τ i ,
where  e i ∈ {0, 1} is agent i ’s decision of whether or not to expend effort using the 
product, R ∈ {RL, RH} is the technology’s return, which is common to all agents, and 
q 0 is the unknown baseline likelihood of staying healthy over the study period, which 
will be controlled for using randomization. Agents have different types t that charac-
terize their beliefs about returns R. We denote by  R t =  피 t R the returns expected by 
an agent of type t. The distribution  F  R t  of expectations  R t in the population need not 
be known to the principal or the agents.8
We assume throughout that effort is private and cannot be monitored by the prin-
cipal. In other words, we assume that all observable dimensions of effort are already 
controlled for, and focus on those dimensions that are not observable. For example, 
with a water treatment product, an experimenter may be able to determine whether 
or not the agent has treated water in his home, but it may be much more difficult to 
determine if the agent drinks treated water when away from home.9
Given effort  e i , agent i ’s expected utility is given by
  피 t [  y i |  e i ] − c e i ,
where c ∈ (RL, RH) is the agents’ cost of effort. In our example, this may be the 
cost of remembering to use the product, the social cost of refusing untreated 
water, or disliking the taste of treated water. In addition, we assume each agent 
has quasilinear preferences with respect to money. An agent’s willingness to pay 
for treatment is  V t = max { R t − c, 0}, which we assume is less than some value 
V max for all agents.
We focus initially on open trials, in which agents know their treatment sta-
tus, and contrast two ways of running trials: a standard RCT, where agents are 
randomly assigned to the treatment group with probability π, and a selective open 
8 For illustrative purposes, this example focuses on heterogenous beliefs as a source of heterogenous behavior 
and returns. In this setting, convincingly identifying true returns to treatment has a large effect on behavior, and 
would be particularly valuable. Moreover, the example allows effort to affect outcomes only in the treatment group. 
The general framework, described in Section II, allows for: general, idiosyncratic, returns; effort in both the treat-
ment and control group; and effort along an arbitrary number of dimensions, which can accommodate dynamic 
effort expenditure.
9 Still, as Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (2012) show, innovative monitoring technologies may be quite effective. To 
the extent that monitoring is feasible, it should be done.
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trial that allows agents to express preferences for treatment by selecting their 
probability of treatment.
The implementation of selective trials we explore here uses the BDM mechanism, 
and proceeds as follows:
 (i) Each agent sends a message  m i ∈ [0,  V max ] indicating his willingness to pay 
for treatment;
 (ii) A price  p i to obtain treatment is independently drawn for each agent from 
a distribution with convex support and c.d.f.  F p that satisfies 0 <  F p (0) <  F p ( V max  ) < 1; and
 (iii) If  m i ≥  p i , the agent obtains the treatment at price p, otherwise, the agent is in 
the control group and no transfers are made.
Note that a higher message m increases an agent’s probability of treatment,  F p (m), 
as well as his expected payment:  ∫
p≤m   p d  F p . As  F p has convex support, it is domi-
nant for an agent of type t to send message m =  V t .
B. The Limits of RCTs and the Value of Self-Selection
Inference from Randomized Controlled Trials.—We begin by considering the 
information produced by an RCT. If agent i is in the treatment group, he chooses to 
expend effort e = 1 if and only if  R t ≥ c. Hence, the average treatment effect identi-
fied by an RCT is
  Δ RCT = 피[ y | τ = 1] − 피[ y | τ = 0]
 = 피[ q 0 + R ×  1  R t ≥c | τ = 1] − 피[ q 0 | τ = 0]
 = R × Prob ( R t > c) = R × (1 −  F  R t  (c)).
When the distribution of agents’ expectations  F  R t  is known, then an RCT will iden-
tify R. In most cases  F  R t  is not known, however, and the average treatment effect Δ RCT provides a garbled signal of the underlying returns R. If the outcomes in the 
treatment group are only weakly better than those in the control group, the principal 
does not know if this is because the water treatment product is not particularly use-
ful, or because the agents did not expend sufficient effort using it.
Inference from Open Selective Trials.—We now turn to selective trials and show 
they are more informative than RCTs.
The selective trial described above elicits agents’ willingness to pay and, condi-
tional on a given willingness to pay V, generates nonempty treatment and control 
groups. As it is dominant for agents to reveal their value truthfully, an agent with value 
V t has probability  F p ( V t ) of being in the treatment group and probability 1 −  F p ( V t ) of 
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being in the control group. Both of these quantities are strictly positive as 0 <  F p (0) < 
F p ( V max ) < 1.10
This trial provides us with the set of local instruments needed by Heckman and 
Vytlacil (2005) to estimate MTEs. That is, for any willingness to pay V, we are able 
to estimate
  Δ MTE (V ) ≡ 피[ y | τ = 1,  V t = V ] − 피[ y | τ = 0,  V t = V ]
 = 피[ y | τ = 1,  m t = V ] − 피[ y | τ = 0,  m t = V ],
which can be used to perform policy simulations in which the distribution of types is 
constant but access to the technology is changed, for example, by subsidies. Moreover, 
MTEs can be integrated to recover the average treatment effect identified by an RCT.
In the current environment, willingness to pay is a good signal of future use, and 
thus MTEs can be used to identify the true returns R. Specifically, all agents with 
value  V t > 0 have expectations  R t such that  R t − c > 0, and expend effort e = 1 
using the technology.11 Hence, it follows that
  Δ MTE (V > 0) = 피[  q 0 + R ×  e t | τ = 1,  V t > 0] − 피[  q 0 | τ = 0,  V t > 0]
 = R.
A selective trial identifies the average treatment effect, MTEs, and true returns R. 
Hence, it is more informative than an RCT, which only identifies the average treat-
ment effect.
The true returns R, and the distribution of valuations  V t , have several policy uses. 
First, knowing R allows us to simulate the treatment effect for a population in which 
all agents expend the appropriate amount of effort. Second, these variables allow 
us to estimate the returns to increasing usage within a given population. Third, and 
finally, the data provided by a selective trial can be used to inform agents and disrupt 
learning traps more effectively than data from an RCT. For example, imagine that 
true returns to the technology are high, but most agents believe they are low. In that 
case, an RCT will measure low returns to the treatment and will not convince agents 
that they should be expending more effort. In contrast, the data generated by a selec-
tive trial would identify that true returns are high, and lead agents to efficiently adopt 
the water treatment product.12
10 Note also that agents with higher value are treated with higher probability. This matters for the precision of 
estimates in actual experiments, where sample size is not infinite. We return to this point in Section III.
11 In this environment, the same result can be obtained by charging a price p for a probability of treatment π such 
that  F  R t   ( p _ π − c) > 0, and evaluating treatment effects only for those willing to pay. The idea that higher prices will 
select individuals who value the technology more, and use it more intensely, can be traced back to the seminal selec-
tion model of Roy (1951). See Oster (1995) for a discussion of related ideas in the context of nonprofit organizations.
12 For empirical work in development economics on the effect of information on behavior, see Thornton (2008), 
Nguyen (2009), or Dupas (2011). For theoretical work on failures of social learning, see the classic models of 
Banerjee (1992) or Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992).
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C. Richer Treatments
In the previous subsection, a selective trial identified true returns because will-
ingness to pay was a good predictor of usage. As our continuing example shows, 
however, this will not always be the case. Thus, MTEs are generally not sufficient 
to infer true returns, nor whether beliefs are affecting measured treatment effects. 
More sophisticated selective trials, however, such as blind selective trials or incen-
tivized selective trials, can be used to recover true returns.
We modify the example so that the returns R to the technology include both base-
line returns and returns to effort: R = ( R b ,  R e ) ∈ 핉2. In the context of a water treat-
ment product,  R b could be the baseline returns to using the product only when it is 
convenient to do so, and  R e the additional returns to using it more thoroughly (for 
example, bringing treated water when away from home). Success rates given effort 
and treatment status are
 Prob( y = 1 | τ = 0, e) =  q 0 
 Prob( y = 1 | τ = 1, e) =  q 0 +  R b + e R e .
An agent of type t has expectation ( R b, t ,  R e, t ) about returns R = ( R b ,  R e ), and expends 
effort if and only if  R e, t ≥ c. Therefore, an agent’s willingness to pay for treatment is 
given by  V t =  R b, t + max { R e, t − c, 0}.
Inference from Open Selective Trials.—We have already shown that open selec-
tive trials can identify treatment effects conditional on willingness to pay. In the 
current environment, however, willingness to pay is no longer a good signal of 
effort. Indeed, there are now two reasons why an agent might value treatment: he 
believes that a thorough use of the product has high returns ( R e, t is high)—the chan-
nel emphasized in Section IB—or he believes that a casual use of the water treat-
ment product is sufficient to obtain high returns and that thorough use brings little 
additional return ( R b, t is high, but  R e, t is low). That is, agents who are willing to pay 
because they think baseline returns are high need not be the agents who will actually 
expend effort. Formally, a selective trial still identifies MTEs,
  Δ MTE (V ) =  R b +  R e Prob ( R e, t ≥ c |  R b, t + max { R e, t − c, 0} = V ),
but these are generally not sufficient to recover  R b and  R e .13 As a result, MTEs are 
insufficient to simulate the returns in a population of agents that all expended appro-
priate effort, or more generally, the returns from increasing the effort of agents. Nor 
do MTEs provide the information needed to infer true returns.
Blind Selective Trials.—In a blind trial, an agent does not know his treatment 
status τ ∈ {0, 1} at the time of effort, but rather, knows his probability ϕ ∈ [0, 1] of 
13 For instance, it is not possible to distinguish a situation in which returns to effort are equal to  R e and a propor-
tion ηV of agents with value V expends effort, from a situation in which returns to effort are 2 R e and a proportion  η _ 2 V 
of agents with value V expends effort.
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having been assigned to the treatment group. Open trials are blind trials where ϕ is 
either 0 or 1.
Given a probability ϕ of being treated, an agent expends effort if and only if 
ϕ R e, t − c > 0. An agent’s expected value for being treated with probability ϕ is
  V t (ϕ) = ϕ R b, t + max {ϕ R e, t − c, 0}.
We depart from standard blind trials in a simple but fundamental way: while they 
keep ϕ fixed and do not infer anything from the specific value of ϕ used, we allow 
ϕ to vary and use both willingness to pay for, and outcomes at, different values of 
ϕ for inference.14
As with open trials, willingness to pay can be elicited using a BDM-type mecha-
nism. Since willingness to pay  V t (ϕ) now depends on ϕ, the mechanism in Section IA 
is implemented after the agent is asked to send a message m(ϕ) for each possible 
value of ϕ. A value of  ϕ i is then drawn independently for each agent from a c.d.f.  F ϕ , 
with full support on [0, 1] and mass points at 0 and 1. The transfer  p i is independently 
drawn from a c.d.f.  F p , as before. If m( ϕ i ) ≥  p i , the agent pays  p i and is allotted the 
treatment with probability  ϕ i ; otherwise, the agent is in the control group and no 
transfers are made.
A first advantage of blind trials is that, unlike open trials, an agent’s actual treat-
ment status τ and his belief ϕ about his treatment status can be different. This allows 
for a robust identification of baseline returns  R b . If an agent is assigned a prob-
ability of treatment 0 < ϕ < 1 low enough that ϕ R H < c, he will not expend any 
effort. Still, proportion ϕ > 0 of such agents receive treatment while a proportion 
1 − ϕ > 0 do not. Hence, we can identify  R b by measuring the effect of treatment 
for agents known not to expend effort:
  R b = 피[ y | ϕ <  c _  R H  , τ = 1] − 피[y | ϕ <  c _  R H  , τ = 0].
A second advantage of blind trials is that the agents’ value mapping  V t (ϕ) allows 
identification of which agents would expend effort when treated for sure. The amount 
that an agent with belief ϕ = 1/2 is willing to pay to learn his treatment status is
  θ t ≡  1 _ 2 [ V t (ϕ = 1) +  V t (ϕ = 0)] −  V t (ϕ = 1/2).
If the agent does not intend to expend effort when treated for sure, he will not 
value information, and  θ t will be equal to 0. Inversely, if the agent does intend to 
expend effort, information is valuable since it allows him to tailor his behavior 
to his treatment status, and thus  θ t > 0.15 In the current example, provided that a 
14 This approach follows an insight from Malani (2006), which identifies placebo effects by examining variation 
in outcomes associated with variations in the probability of treatment across blinded experiments.
15 This result holds very generally—see Proposition 5. To verify this relationship in the current example, note 
that if the agent expends effort conditional on being treated for sure (that is,  R e, t > c), then
 θ t =  1 _ 2 [ R b, t +  R e, t − c] −  1 _ 2  R b, t − max { 1 _ 2  R e, t − c, 0} ≥ min {  R e, t − c _2  ,  c _ 2 } > 0.
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positive measure of agents satisfies  θ t > 0, we can identify  R e using either of the 
following expressions:
  R e = 피[y | ϕ = 1,  θ t > 0, τ = 1] − 피[ y | ϕ = 1,  θ t = 0, τ = 1]
 = 피[ y | ϕ = 1,  θ t > 0, τ = 1] − 피[ y | ϕ <  c _  R H  ,  θ t > 0, τ = 1].
Incentivized Selective Trials.—We now show that incentivized selective trials can 
provide the principal with information similar to that produced by blind selective tri-
als. This is useful as in many areas of economic interest blind trials are not practical 
due to the lack of suitable, or ethical, placebos.
In an incentivized selective trial, an agent obtains a treatment status τ ∈ {0, 1}, 
makes a fixed transfer p (which can be positive or negative), and is given a bonus 
(or penalty) w in the event that y = 1. Note that if p > 0 and w > 0, then an agent is 
assigned an incentive contract. If, instead, p < 0 and w < 0, an agent is assigned an 
insurance contract.
Given a bonus level w, an agent expends effort if and only if (1 + w) R e, t − c > 0. 
In turn, an agent’s willingness to pay for treatment, given bonus w, is
  V t (w) = (1 + w) R b, t + max {(1 + w) R e, t − c, 0}.
As before, the mapping w ↦  V t (w) can be elicited using a variant of the BDM mech-
anism (described in Appendix Section II). Incentivized trials allow us to evaluate 
baseline returns in a straightforward manner. When offered a full insurance contract 
w 0 = − 1, an agent will expend effort e = 0 so that
  R b = 피[ y | w =  w 0 , τ = 1] − 피[ y | w =  w 0 , τ = 0].
In turn, notice that for any type t with  R e, t > 0, there exists a value  w t such that 
whenever w >  w t , the agent expends effort e = 1. The value  w t is identified from the 
mapping w ↦  V t (w) as
  ∂  V t _∂ w  |  w> w t  =  R e, t +  R b, t >  R b, t =  ∂  V t  _∂ w  |  w< w t  .
Additionally, this last expression allows us to identify the agent’s subjective beliefs 
about baseline returns and returns to effort ( R b, t ,  R e, t ). For a value  _ w sufficiently high 
that it induces some agents to expend effort, returns to effort can be identified by 
either of the following expressions:
 R e = 피[ y | w =  _ w,  _ w −  w t > 0, τ = 1] − 피[ y | w =  _ w,  _ w −  w t < 0, τ = 1]
 = 피[ y | w =  _ w,  _ w −  w t > 0, τ = 1] − 피[ y | w =  w 0 ,  _ w −  w t > 0, τ = 1].
Thus, just like blind selective trials, incentivized selective trials identify true returns 
R = ( R b ,  R e ).
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Altogether, this section suggests that while unobserved effort is a concern for the 
external validity of standard randomized controlled trials, appropriate ex ante trial 
design—rather than ex post data treatment—may help in alleviating this concern.
The rest of the paper explores how these results extend in a general framework 
that allows for many realistic elements. In particular, this general framework allows 
for arbitrary heterogeneity among agents, including heterogeneous preferences, 
beliefs, and returns. Moreover, the general framework allows for multidimensional 
effort in both the treatment and control group. This allows the model to accommo-
date complex technologies, dynamic effort expenditure, and attempts by agents in 
the control group to obtain substitute treatments.
The following sections provide systematic results about which mechanisms are 
the most informative, what sampling patterns they produce, and what can be inferred 
from the data they generate.
II. A General Framework
We now generalize the framework used in our example. Once again, there are 
infinitely many agents, indexed by i ∈ 핅. Returns to the technology, however, 
are now described by a multidimensional parameter R ∈  ⊂ 핉κ.
Types.—Each agent i has a type t ∈ , which includes a belief about returns R, as 
well as other factors that might affect behavior and outcomes, such as idiosyncratic 
costs of effort, idiosyncratic returns, and beliefs about such factors. We assume that 
agents are exchangeable, so that their types are i.i.d. draws from some distribution 
χ ∈ Δ( ), which is itself a random variable. A profile of types is given by t ∈   핅 . 
For concision we omit publicly observable traits, but it is straightforward to allow 
for them.
Outcomes and Success Rates.—Agent i obtains an outcome  y i ∈ {0, 1}.16 An 
agent’s true and perceived likelihoods of success (that is, Prob ( y = 1)) depend on 
his type, the aggregate returns to the technology, and the agent’s effort choice e ∈ E, 
where E is a compact subset of  핉  κ ′  .
Success rates are denoted by
 q(R, t,  τ i ,  e i ) = Prob ( y = 1 | R, t,  τ i ,  e i )
  q t ( τ i ,  e i ) =  ∫ 
R
 
 
q(R , t,  τ i ,  e i ) d t(R),
where q(R, t, τ, e) is the true success rate of an agent of type t—which allows for idio-
syncratic, heterogeneous returns—while  q t (τ, e) is the probability of success per-
ceived by an agent of type t—which allows for idiosyncratic, heterogeneous beliefs 
about those returns. We assume that q and  q t are continuous with respect to effort e. 
Note that as e can be multidimensional, the model is consistent with dynamic effort 
16 As Appendix Section I shows, binary outcomes simplify notation, but are not essential to our results.
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expenditure, and agents learning about returns to treatment, or their treatment status 
(as in Philipson and Desimone 1997, or Chan and Hamilton 2006).17
Preferences.—Given effort  e i , treatment status  τ i , monetary transfer  p i , and final 
outcome  y i , agent i ’s utility is u( y i ,  t i ) − c( e i ,  t i ) −  p i .
Note that  p i can be negative and all transfers can be shifted by a fixed amount, for 
example, when there is compensation for participating in the experiment. Such com-
pensation may be used to increase participation, or relax agents’ cash constraints.18
Assignment Mechanisms.—We distinguish three ways of assigning treatment:
 (i) Open selective trials are mechanisms  g o = ( M o ,  μ o ) where  M o is a set of mes-
sages and μo : Mo → Δ({0, 1} × 핉) maps individual messages to a probabil-
ity distribution over treatment status  τ i ∈ {0, 1} and transfers  p i ∈ 핉;
 (ii) Blind selective trials are mechanisms  g b = ( M b ,  μ b ) where  M b is a set of mes-
sages and μb : Mb → Δ([0, 1] × 핉) maps messages to a probability distribu-
tion over uncertain treatment status  ϕ i = Prob( τ i = 1) and transfers  p i ; and
 (iii) Incentivized selective trials are mechanisms  g w = ( M w ,  μ w ) where  M w is a set 
of messages and μw : Mw → Δ({0, 1} × 핉 × 핉) maps messages to a proba-
bility distribution over treatment status  τ i , a fixed transfer  p i from the agent to 
the principal, and a bonus  w i transferred from the principal to the agent con-
ditional on  y i = 1.
Note that these are single-agent mechanisms. Agent i ’s final assignment depends 
only on his message, and not on messages sent by others. We denote the likelihood 
of being given the treatment when sending message m by π(m) ≡ Prob (τ = 1 | m). 
We focus on mechanisms g such that χ-almost surely every agent i has a dominant 
message  m g ( t i ). In all these designs, agents can probabilistically select their assign-
ment using messages, hence the name selective trials.
Informativeness of Mechanisms.—We evaluate mechanisms according to their 
informativeness in the sense of Blackwell (1951, 1953). We say a mechanism g is 
at least as informative as a mechanism g′, denoted by g′ ⪯ g, if the data generated 
by g′ can be simulated using only data generated by g.
Specifically, denote by  a i the assignment given to agent i by whichever mecha-
nism is chosen. The principal observes data  d g = ( m i ,  a i ,  y i ) i∈핅 . Denote by   g the 
17 For example, it is not enough for agents to just expend effort spreading fertilizer. As Duflo, Kremer, and 
Robinson (2008) highlight, effort is needed to choose the appropriate seeds to go with the fertilizer, to learn how 
much and when to water the crops, and to learn how much fertilizer gives the highest returns at the lowest cost. In 
this case, it is natural to think of effort as a vector, where the first component corresponds to choosing the amount 
of fertilizer, the second to picking the right seeds, the third to properly applying it, and so on.
To accommodate dynamic effort expenditure, different dimensions of the effort vector may indicate contingent 
effort expenditure depending on realized observables, such as the state of crops, or how they seem to respond to 
previous fertilizer use.
18 Appendix Section I allows for agents with nonquasilinear preferences and thus tradeoffs between treatment 
and nonmonetary costs.
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set of possible data sequences generated by mechanism g. Mechanism g′, g satisfy 
g′ ⪯ g if and only if there exists a fixed data manipulation procedure h :   g → Δ(   g ′  ) such that for all t ∈   핅 , R ∈ , h( d g (t, R)) ∼  d  g ′  (t, R).
This notion of informativeness is easier to work with in environments with infi-
nite samples, as it focuses on issues of identification rather than issues of statistical 
power. This definition also applies, however, in the case of finitely many agents.19
Although our framework is quite general, we intentionally limit our approach 
in three ways. First, we assume agents are rational, that is, they play undominated 
strategies, regardless of the complexity of the assignment mechanism. Second, we 
examine only single-agent mechanisms. Third, despite the fact that effort expen-
diture may be dynamic, we restrict attention to mechanisms that elicit preferences 
only once. Note, however, that the timing of this elicitation may be chosen freely 
by the principal. Specifically, messages could be elicited before agents have any 
exposure to the technology, or after they have assessed it. Section VI discusses the 
limitations of assuming rationality and examining only single-agent mechanisms, 
and the difficulties of eliciting preferences more than once.
III. Open Selective Trials
In open selective trials, an agent is assigned a treatment status τ and a transfer p 
based on message m. Given this assignment (τ, p), the indirect utility of an agent 
with type t is  V t (τ ) − p where
  V t (τ ) =  max 
e∈E  q t (τ, e)u( y = 1, t) + [1 −  q t (τ, e)]u( y = 0, t) − c(e, t).
We normalize the value of being in the control group  V t (τ = 0) to zero for every 
type. Hence  V t ≡  V t (τ = 1) denotes the agent’s willingness to pay for treatment. 
For simplicity, we assume that there exists a known value  V max ∈ 핉 > 0 such that 
for all t ∈ ,  V t ∈ (− V max ,  V max ), and that the distribution over values induced by the 
distribution of types χ admits a density. The optimal effort for type t given treatment 
status τ is denoted by  e * (τ, t).20
A. Information Production in Open Selective Trials
Our first result highlights the fact that selective trials are natural extensions of 
RCTs. An RCT is a mechanism  g 0 = (~,  π 0 ). As M = ~, no messages are sent, all 
agents are assigned to the treatment group with the same probability  π 0 ∈ (0, 1), and 
there are no transfers.
FACT 1 (Full Support Sampling): Consider a mechanism g = (M, μ). If there 
exists ξ > 0 such that for all m ∈ M, π(m) ∈ (ξ, 1 − ξ), then, with infinite samples, 
g 0 ⪯ g.
19 With infinite samples, sampling patterns do not matter. Thus, there is a large equivalence class of most infor-
mative mechanisms. When samples are finite, these mechanisms remain undominated in the sense of Blackwell 
(1951, 1953), but need no longer be equivalent.
20 At this stage, whether optimal effort is unique or not does not matter. We explicitly assume a unique optimal 
effort level in Sections IV and V to apply a convenient version of the Envelope Theorem.
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PROOF: 
All proofs can be found in the online Appendix.
Recalling that π(m) ≡ Prob (τ = 1 | m), Fact 1 shows that if every type has a posi-
tive probability of being in the treatment and control group, then mechanism g is as 
informative as an RCT. This holds for any ξ > 0 because the sample size is infinite. 
The assumption of infinite samples—which is maintained throughout the paper—is 
important for all of our identification results. We discuss sampling issues that arise 
with finite samples in Section IIIB.
As Plott and Zeiler (2005) and others show, information elicited in nonincen-
tive-compatible ways can be unreliable. Moreover, as Kremer and Miguel (2007) 
and others note, reported beliefs about a technology’s return are often uncorrelated 
with use. Therefore, we focus on strictly incentive-compatible assignment mecha-
nisms—assignment mechanisms such that χ-almost every agent has a strictly pre-
ferred message.21
Our next result shows that an open selective trial is a most informative trial if and 
only if it identifies each agent’s value  V t , and, conditional on any expressed valua-
tion, assigns a positive mass of agents to both the treatment and control group.
PROPOSITION 1 (Most Informative Mechanisms): Any strictly incentive-compat-
ible mechanism g identifies at most value  V t (that is,  V t =  V  t ′  ⇒  m g (t) =  m g (t′ )).
Whenever g identifies values  V t (that is,  m g (t) =  m g (t′ ) ⇒  V t =  V  t ′  ) and satis-
fies full support (0 < in f m π(m) and su p m π(m) < 1), then for any strictly incentive-
compatible mechanism g′, g′ ⪯ g.
It follows that open selective trials can identify at most the distribution of returns 
conditional on agents’ valuations, which can be used to construct MTEs. It is impor-
tant to note that these mechanisms identify MTEs independently of the experiment-
er’s beliefs. Hence, to the extent that elicited values are reliable, these mechanisms 
identify MTEs with a degree of robustness comparable to that with which RCTs 
identify average treatment effects.22
Implementing Most Informative Trials.—Here we exhibit two straightforward 
implementations of most informative selective trials. The first is the BDM mecha-
nism described in Section IA, with the expanded message space M = [ − V max ,  V max ]. 
Once again, the principal draws a price  p i ∈ [ − V max ,  V max ] independently for each 
agent from a common c.d.f.  F p with support [ − V max ,  V max ]. If  m i ≥  p i , then the agent 
is assigned (τ = 1,  p i ); otherwise, he is assigned (τ = 0, 0).
21 Note that the mechanisms we consider can accommodate surveys. Consider the mechanism g = (,  π 0 ) 
where the message space M = , the likelihood of treatment is constant and equal to  π 0 , and no transfers are 
made. This is essentially an RCT supplemented with a rich survey. As assignment does not depend on the mes-
sage, truthful revelation of one’s type is weakly dominant. Unfortunately, any other message is also weakly 
dominant. Hence, data generated by such a mechanism is likely to be unreliable, especially if figuring out one’s 
preferences is costly.
22 Note that selective trials also identify higher-order moments of the outcome distribution conditional on treat-
ment status and willingness to pay, which may be useful to researchers.
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FACT 2 (BDM Implementation): Whenever  F p has full support over [ − V max ,  V max ], 
an agent with value  V t sends optimal message  m BDM =  V t and the BDM mechanism 
is a most informative mechanism.
A second implementation is a menu of lotteries. Consider mechanism  g * , where 
M = (−  1 _ 2 ,  1 _ 2 ), any agent sending message m is assigned to the treatment group with 
probability π(m) =  1 _ 2 + m, and must make a transfer p(m) =  V max  m 2 . One can think 
of agents as having a baseline probability of being in the treatment group equal to  1 _ 2
and deciding by how much they want to deviate from this baseline. An agent with 
value  V t chooses message m to maximize
 π(m) V t − p(m) =  V t ( 1 _ 2 + m) −  V max  m 2 .
This problem is concave in m, and first-order conditions yield an optimal message 
V t /2 V max , which identifies  V t . In addition, every agent is assigned to the treatment and 
control group with positive probability. Thus,  g * is a most informative mechanism.
Note that  g * gives agents higher expected utility than an RCT that assigns agents 
to the treatment and control group with probability  1 _ 2 . More generally, for any RCT, 
a selective trial that assigns price p = 0 for a probability of treatment π equal to that 
of the RCT must increase the agents’ expected utility. Thus, selective trials may help 
decrease the number of agents who refuse randomization. This is potentially useful 
as refusals reduce the external validity of treatment effects (Malani 2008).23
B. The Cost of Running Selective Trials
In equilibrium, the menu of lotteries  g * yields sampling profile π(V ) 
= 1 _ 2 (1 +  V _  V max  ), which is strictly increasing in value V. In the BDM mechanism, the 
sampling profile  π BDM (V ) =  F p (V ) is also increasing in V. This property holds for 
any mechanism.
PROPOSITION 2 (Monotonicity): Consider a strictly incentive compatible mecha-
nism g. If agents t and t′ with values  V t >  V  t ′  send messages  m g (t) ≠  m g (t′ ), then it 
must be that π( m g (t)) > π( m g (t′ )).
Thus, in any selective trial, agents with high values are oversampled—they have 
a higher likelihood of being in the treatment group—and those with low values are 
undersampled. In contrast, RCTs have a flat sampling profile. While sampling pat-
terns do not matter when there is an arbitrarily large number of agents, they can 
significantly affect statistical power when samples are finite.
This issue is related to the recent debate in development economics about charg-
ing for treatment in RCTs.24 If, as in Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro (2010), willingness 
to pay is correlated with product usage, then eliciting willingness to pay might be 
23 Jadad and Enkin (2007) reports refusal rates approaching 50 percent in some medical trials.
24 This literature is motivated by questions of efficiency, and is mostly interested in whether charging for usage 
improves how well treatment is matched with those who need and use it. This paper takes a slightly different per-
spective, and is interested in how controlling for willingness to pay improves inference from experimental trials.
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quite useful in understanding true returns. If, instead, as in Cohen and Dupas (2010), 
most agents have low values, and willingness to pay is a poor predictor of actual 
use, then undersampling agents with low values may significantly reduce statistical 
power. Furthermore, in such a setting, willingness to pay provides little information 
about intended use.25
We make two contributions to this debate. First, we note that when trade-offs 
between money and treatment are uninformative, selective trials can and should be 
based on more informative trade-offs. For instance, if most of the heterogeneity in 
willingness to pay is driven by wealth and credit constraints, then eliciting willing-
ness to wait, or willingness to perform a tedious task—like sitting through multiple 
information sessions—may be a better indicator of future usage than willingness to 
pay. As we discuss in Section VI, this requires some knowledge of the agents and 
their environment.
Second, we show that carefully designed selective trials can reduce the costs of 
oversampling agents with high values by reducing the slope of the sampling profile.
PROPOSITION 3 (Sampling Rates and Incentives): For any mechanism g = (M, μ) 
and  ρ _ <  _ ρ in (0, 1), there exists a mechanism g′ = (M, μ′ ) such that g ⪯ g′, and for 
all m ∈ M, π′ (m) ∈ [  _ ρ,  _ ρ ].
The following must also hold. Denoting the expected utility of type t sending mes-
sage m in mechanism g′ (including transfers) by U(t | m, g′ ), then
  max   
 m 1 ,  m 2 ∈M | U(t |  m 1 , g′ ) − U(t |  m 2 , g′ ) | ≤ 2( 
_ ρ −  ρ _) V max .
Proposition 3 implies that it is always possible to reduce the slope of a mechanism’s 
sampling profile without affecting identification. Unfortunately, reducing the slope 
of the sampling profile also reduces incentives for truth-telling. We illustrate this with 
the family of mechanisms ( g λ *) λ∈(0,1) which generalize  g * as follows: M = (−  1 _ 2 ,  1 _ 2 ), π(m) =  1 _ 2 + λm, and p(m) = λ V max  m 2 . As the slope of the sampling profile λ goes 
to zero, each agent will be sampled with probability approaching  1 _ 2 and will pay 
an amount approaching zero, irrespective of the message he sends. For any λ > 0, 
m =  V t /2 V max is still a dominant strategy for an agent of type t. If an agent with value 
V t instead sends message V/2 V max with V ≠  V t , however, his expected loss is
 U(t | m =  V t /2 V max ) − U(t | m = V/2 V max ) =  λ _ 4 V max  ( V t − V ) 
2 ,
which vanishes as the slope of the sampling profile λ goes to 0.
Importantly, although there is a trade-off between oversampling agents with high 
values and the noisiness of the preference information that may be elicited, the 
slope of the sampling profile is a free parameter over which the principal can, and 
should, optimize.
Altogether, this section has shown that open selective trials provide a simple way 
to identify MTEs and, more generally, the distribution of returns conditional on 
willingness to pay. In addition, while selective trials systematically oversample 
25 As Dupas (2010) shows, this can also hinder social learning.
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high-value agents, this issue is negligible when sample size is large or agents are 
very responsive to incentives. As Section I highlights, however, willingness to pay 
need not be a good predictor of actual effort, and MTEs may not allow identification 
of deep parameters of interest. The following sections explore richer treatments that 
can better identify the role of effort.
IV. Blind Selective Trials
A. Framework and Basic Results
In blind trials, an agent is assigned a probability of being in the treatment group, 
ϕ ∈ [0, 1], which is disclosed to the agent, and an actual treatment status, τ ∈ {0, 1}, 
which is known only to the principal. Thus, the pair (τ, ϕ) can be thought of as a 
full description of an agent’s overall treatment. Blind selective trials nest both open 
selective trials, where ϕ ∈ {0, 1}, and standard blind trials, where ϕ is fixed.
Assignment Mechanisms.—As noted in Section II, selective blind trials are mech-
anisms g = (M, μ) where μ : M → Δ([0, 1] × 핉). Given a message m, μ assigns 
the agent a likelihood of being treated ϕ ∈ [0, 1], and a transfer p ∈ 핉. An actual, 
and unrevealed, treatment status τ ∈ {0, 1} is drawn according to ϕ.
Utility and Effort.—An agent of type t ’s value for uncertain treatment status ϕ is
(1)   V t (ϕ) =  max 
e∈E (ϕqt (τ = 1, e) + (1 − ϕ)qt (τ = 0, e))
 × (u(y = 1, t) − u( y = 0, t)) + u( y = 0, t) − c(e, t).
The corresponding effort decision is  e * (ϕ, t), which we assume is unique.26 
Consistent with earlier notation, we maintain  V t (ϕ = 0) = 0. Note that  V t (ϕ = 1) =  V t 
is the agent’s value for treatment in an open trial. Throughout the section, we keep ϕ 
as an argument of  V t (ϕ) and denote the value of  V t (ϕ) at φ by  V t (ϕ = φ). Thus,  V t (ϕ) 
denotes the entire mapping: φ ↦  V t (ϕ = φ). Denoting by μ(ϕ | m) the distribution of 
assignments ϕ given message m, we have:
PROPOSITION 4 (Most Informative Mechanisms): Any strictly incentive-compati-
ble blind mechanism g identifies at most the mapping  V t (ϕ) (that is,  V t (ϕ) =  V  t ′  (ϕ) ⇒  m g (t) =  m g (t′ )).
 If g identifies  V t (ϕ) (that is,  m g (t) =  m g (t′ ) ⇒  V t (ϕ) =  V  t ′  (ϕ)) and satisfies 
in f ϕ, m μ(ϕ | m) > 0 then g′ ⪯ g for any strictly incentive-compatible mechanism g′.
A simple generalization of the BDM mechanism is a most informative blind trial. 
The blind BDM Mechanism (bBDM) is composed of distributions  F ϕ over [0, 1], 
and  F p | ϕ over [ − V max ,  V max  ] with densities bounded away from 0, and the message 
space M = [ − V max ,  V max  ] [0, 1] , so that a message m corresponds to a value function 
26 Using the results of Milgrom and Segal (2002), this allows us to apply the usual Envelope Theorem to  V t (ϕ) 
in Proposition 6. Note that this also implies that  e * (ϕ, t) is continuous in ϕ.
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V t (ϕ). An agent sends message  m i , and the principal draws values  ϕ i = φ and  p i 
according to distributions  F ϕ and  F p | φ . If  m i (φ) ≥  p i , the agent is assigned (φ,  p i ). 
Otherwise, the agent is assigned (0, 0). It is straightforward to show that  m bBDM (t) =  V t (ϕ). Additionally, bBDM satisfies the full sampling constraint:  inf ϕ, m μ(ϕ | m) > 0.
Blind selective trials have two distinct advantages over open selective trials. 
First, blind selective trials distinguish an agent’s belief ϕ and treatment status τ. As 
detailed in the next subsection, this allows the principal to identify whether empiri-
cal success rates are being driven by the agent’s behavior or by the treatment itself. 
Second, by identifying the value function  V t (ϕ), blind selective trials provide useful 
information about an agent’s intended behavior and his perceived success rate under 
different conditions.
B. The Value of Distinguishing Beliefs and Treatment Status
Changes in success rates due to treatment come from two sources: the effect of 
the treatment itself, and the effect of behavioral changes induced by treatment. In 
an open trial, changes in behavior are perfectly correlated with changes in treatment 
status. As a result, the effect of treatment and the effect of behavioral changes are 
difficult to distinguish. In contrast, following the central insight of Malani (2006), 
we show that blind trials can disentangle these two effects by distinguishing an 
agent’s actual treatment status τ and his (correct) belief ϕ that he is being treated.
Measured success rate 피[ y |  V t (ϕ), ϕ = φ, τ ], conditional on the value function 
V t (ϕ), belief ϕ = φ, and treatment status τ, is directly identified by selective blind 
trials. This allows identification of MTEs conditioned on the entire value function, 
Δ MTE ( V t (ϕ)), as well as the pure treatment and behavioral effects  Δ T ( V t (ϕ)) and 
 Δ B ( V t (ϕ)):
  Δ T  ( V t (ϕ)) =  lim φ→0  φ>0
피[ y |  V t (ϕ), ϕ = φ, τ = 1] − 피[ y |  V t (ϕ), ϕ = φ, τ = 0]
  Δ B  ( V t (ϕ)) =  lim φ→1  φ<1
피[ y |  V t (ϕ), ϕ = φ, τ = 0] − 피[ y |  V t (ϕ), ϕ = 0, τ = 0].
As φ approaches zero, an agent’s effort converges to  e * (τ = 0, t), the effort he 
would expend if he knew he was not treated.27 Hence,  Δ T identifies the returns to 
treatment keeping the agent’s behavior at its default level  e * (τ = 0, t). Similarly, as 
φ approaches one, the agent’s effort converges to  e * (τ = 1, t), the effort associated 
with sure treatment. Thus,  Δ B is the effect of behavior change alone. Finally,
  Δ I ≡  Δ MTE −  Δ T −  Δ B 
measures the aggregate treatment effect (conditional on value  V t (ϕ)), net of the 
effect of treatment and behavior alone. That is,  Δ I measures the interaction effect 
27 We use a continuity argument because ϕ = 0 implies τ = 0, hence, there is no treatment group. This is essen-
tially an identification at infinity argument, as in Heckman (1990) or Heckman and Honoré (1990), which entails 
well-known practical difficulties.
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between behavior and treatment. If  Δ I is positive, then treatment and effort changes 
are complementary in producing successful outcomes. If, instead,  Δ I is negative, 
this suggests that there is a negative interaction between treatment and the perceived 
optimal effort of agents.28
Being able to identify  Δ T ,  Δ B , and  Δ I refines the way we evaluate the value added 
of treatments: pure behavioral effects  Δ B do not contribute to value added; on the 
other hand, both the pure treatment effect  Δ T and the interaction effect  Δ I contribute 
to value added since they could not be obtained without treatment. This has impor-
tant practical implications. Consider, for example, a cholesterol-reducing drug. If 
agents react to anticipated treatment by eating more fatty foods, so that  Δ B is large 
and negative, the aggregate effect of treatment could be quite small even if the effect 
of the drug alone is significant. Similarly, consider an antidepressant that works only 
if patients expend significant effort changing their habits. If effort and treatment are 
very complementary, it may be that  Δ B =  Δ T = 0 while  Δ I is large. In this case an 
analysis of value added limited to pure treatment effects would wrongly determine 
that the antidepressant is worthless.
When interpreting  Δ B and  Δ I it is important to keep in mind that these are the 
direct and interaction effects at the agents’ perceived optimal effort level  e * (τ = 1, t). 
Consequently, if  Δ I and  Δ B are small, this may be because effort does not improve 
the success rate of treatment, or because the agent is expending inappropriate effort. 
In order to distinguish these two possibilities, we need additional information on 
the effort of agents. As the following subsection shows, this is what  V t (ϕ) provides.
C. The Value of Eliciting Preferences  V t (ϕ)
As highlighted in Section IC, the mapping  V t (ϕ) can tell us whether, and by how 
much, treatment changes an agent’s effort. Recalling that  V t (ϕ = 0) = 0, knowledge 
of the mapping  V t (ϕ) provides the following simple test.
PROPOSITION 5 (A Test of “Intention to Change Behavior”):
If  e * (ϕ = 0, t) =  e * (ϕ = 1, t), then for all φ,  V t (ϕ = φ) = φ V t (ϕ = 1). 
If  e * (ϕ = 0, t) ≠  e * (ϕ = 1, t), then for all φ ∈ (0, 1),  V t (ϕ = φ) < φ V t (ϕ = 1).
When effort changes with τ, the agent gets additional surplus from tailoring his 
behavior to his treatment status. The difference φ V t (ϕ = 1) −  V t (ϕ = φ) is thus the 
agent’s willingness to pay to learn his actual treatment status, which will be zero if 
effort is independent of treatment.29 Recalling that  q t (τ, e) is the perceived success 
28 These quantities can also be measured unconditionally across the entire agent population, or conditioned only 
on the value for sure treatment,  V t . Moreover,  Δ T can be estimated using a standard blind RCT with a sufficiently 
low value of ϕ.
Note that selective blind trials can allow for double-blind designs in which the principal has varying beliefs about 
the likelihood that an agent is being treated. Varying the beliefs of the principal may help identify the treatment 
effect due to variations in the principal’s behavior. A proper analysis of this approach requires a better understanding 
of the principal’s incentive problem, which we abstract away from in this paper.
29 When φ = 1/2 this coincides with test statistic  θ t defined in Section IC.
Note that in a richer decision theoretic framework, agents may have preferences for early revelation of uncer-
tainty, even though their actions do not depend on information (Kreps and Porteus 1978). In such a framework, an 
agent’s value for information would be a noisy (but still informative) signal of intent to change behavior.
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rate of an agent with type t, the value function  V t (ϕ) also allows us to estimate an 
agent’s perceived returns to effort.
PROPOSITION 6 (Identifying Perceived Returns to Effort): For any value φ,
  ∂  V t (ϕ) _∂ ϕ   | φ = [ q t (τ = 1,  e * (φ, t)) −  q t (τ = 0,  e * (φ, t))]
 × [u(y = 1, t ) − u(y = 0, t )].
In particular, we can compute the agent’s perceived increase in treatment effects 
when moving from default effort (induced by φ = 0) to perceived optimal effort 
given treatment (induced by φ = 1):
  ∂  V t (ϕ) _∂ ϕ  | 1 / ∂  V t (ϕ) _∂ ϕ  | 0 =   q t (τ = 1,  e * (φ = 1, t)) −  q t (τ = 0,  e * (φ = 1, t)) ____ q t (τ = 1,  e * (φ = 0, t)) −  q t (τ = 0,  e * (φ = 0, t))  .
This data helps evaluate whether underprovision of effort is to blame for low 
returns to treatment.30 Returning to the example in Section I, imagine a trial of a 
water treatment product known to the principal to be effective only if agents use it 
whenever they drink water. If measured returns to the treatment are low, there are 
two competing explanations: (i) the treatment is not effective in the agents’ disease 
environment, or (ii) agents are not expending appropriate effort using the prod-
uct. Agents’ perceived returns can help distinguish these explanations. If perceived 
returns to effort are high, then the agent is likely to be expending significant effort, 
and it is more likely that the treatment is not effective in a particular disease environ-
ment. If, instead, perceived returns are low, it becomes more likely that the treatment 
has an effect that is unmeasured due to agents’ lack of effort.
Preference data  V t (ϕ) may also provide some insight into the nature of placebo 
effects. Under a sufficiently broad definition of behavior—including unconscious 
or involuntary behavior—behavioral treatment effects  Δ B are largely undistinguish-
able from placebo effects (Malani 2006). Because indirect preferences identify 
whether or not agents intend to change their behavior (Proposition 5), however, 
this data provides some indication of whether behavioral effects  Δ B are driven by 
changes in behavior of which the agent is aware. For instance, if agents do not value 
information ( V t (ϕ = φ) = φ V t (ϕ = 1)), and yet exhibit positive behavioral effects ( Δ B > 0), this suggests that changes in behavior the agent is unaware of are driving 
behavioral effects.
30 Identifying these derivatives requires the precise elicitation of an agent’s preferences. This relies heavily on 
the rationality of agents, but not sample size.
Note that the logic underlying Proposition 5 implies  V t (ϕ) must be convex. This follows from the fact that any 
mean preserving spread in belief ϕ is equivalent to the arrival of a signal about treatment status. As more informa-
tion is necessarily useful in this setting, this implies that  V t (ϕ) is convex. Thus, in practice, it may be preferable 
to use simpler mechanisms that elicit  V t (ϕ) for very few values of ϕ, and construct discrete approximations of the 
desired derivatives. As  V t (ϕ) is convex in ϕ, a few points are sufficient to obtain correct bounds on these derivatives.
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V. Incentivized Selective Trials
We now show how quantities similar to those identified by blind selective trials 
can be identified without a placebo. This can be accomplished using an incentivized 
selective trial, which allows agents to express preferences over contracts.31
A. Framework and Basic Results
Assignment Mechanisms.—As noted in Section II, an incentivized trial is a 
mechanism g = (M, μ), where μ : M → Δ({0, 1} × 핉 × 핉). Given a message 
m, μ is used to draw a treatment status τ, a fixed transfer p from the agent, as well 
as a bonus w transferred to the agent in the event of success. Note that both p and 
w may be negative in the case of insurance. The pair (τ, w) can be thought of as an 
aggregate treatment.
Utility and Effort.—The agents’ indirect preferences over contracts (τ, w), denoted 
by  V t (τ, w), are given by
(2)  V t (τ, w) =  max 
e∈E  q t (τ, e)[u(y = 1, t) + w] 
 + [1 −  q t (τ, e)]u( y = 0, t) − c(e, t).
We denote by  e * (τ, w, t) the induced effort level, and maintain the normalization 
 V t (τ = 0, w = 0) = 0.
Insurance.—A specific value of w that will be useful is  w 0, t ≡ − [u(y = 1, t) − 
u( y = 0, t)], the utility difference between success ( y = 1) and failure ( y = 0) for an 
agent of type t. The transfer  w 0, t essentially provides an agent with perfect insurance 
over the outcome y. When fully insured, an agent will choose e to minimize the cost 
of his effort, regardless of his treatment status. We refer to this effort choice as no 
effort. Note that no effort differs from the default behavior of untreated agents in an 
open trial, as they may still be expending effort to improve their success rate.
We proceed by assuming that  w 0, t is known to the principal. At the end of the sec-
tion we show that under mild assumptions,  w 0, t can be inferred from elicited prefer-
ences  V t (τ, w).
B. What Can Be Inferred from Incentivized Trials?
It is straightforward to extend Propositions 1 and 4, which characterize most 
informative mechanisms. That is, g is a most informative incentivized trial if it 
identifies the mapping  V t (τ, w) and, given any message, puts positive density on 
all possible treatments (τ, w). As before, the BDM mechanism can be adapted to 
identify  V t (τ, w)—Appendix Section II provides a detailed description. Note that 
31 For field experiments using explicit incentives, see, for instance, Gertler (2004); Schultz (2004); 
Volpp et al. (2006, 2008); Thornton (2008); and Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2009). A fully worked-out numeri-
cal example illustrating inference from incentivized trials is given in the online Appendix.
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the information produced by incentivized trials nests that produced by open trials. 
In particular,  V t (τ = 1, w = 0) =  V t .
As in the case of blind selective trials, incentivized selective trials allow us to dis-
entangle the effects of treatment and effort, as well as infer an agent’s perception of 
how effort affects outcomes. Incentivized selective trials recover the empirical suc-
cess rate 피[ y |  V t (τ, w), τ, w] as a function of preferences, treatment, and incentives. 
This will be independent of reward w if effort does not matter for outcomes, or if 
incentives do not affect effort expenditure.
Isolating Returns to Treatment and Returns to Effort.—A contract with transfer 
 w 0, t ≡ −[u( y = 1, t) − u( y = 0, t)] provides an agent of type t with perfect insurance. 
Thus, the agent expends no effort, regardless of his treatment status. Given  w 0, t , we 
can identify two quantities similar to those discussed in Section IVB:
 Returns to Treatment | No Effort = 피[ y |  V t (τ, w), τ = 1, w =  w 0, t ]
 − 피[y |  V t (τ, w), τ = 0, w =  w 0, t ]
 Returns to Effort | Treatment = 피[ y |  V t (τ, w), τ = 1, w = 0]
 − 피[ y |  V t (τ, w), τ = 1, w =  w 0, t ].
Note that here returns are measured using no effort as a baseline, rather than the 
default effort level  e * (τ = 0, w = 0, t) expended by agents in the control group of an 
open trial.32
Identifying Perceived Returns to Effort.—Indirect preferences over contracts  V t (τ, w) 
also provide information on perceived returns to effort. Recall that  q t (τ, e) denotes the 
agent’s perceived likelihood of success given treatment status τ and effort e.
PROPOSITION 7 (Identifying Perceived Success Rates):
 ∀τ, w,   ∂  V t (τ, w) _∂ w  =  q t (τ,  e * (τ, w, t)).
Given knowledge of  w 0, t , this allows us to compute subjective returns to treatment 
and perceived optimal effort:
 Perceived Returns to Treatment =  q t (τ = 1, w =  w 0, t |  V t (τ, w))
 −  q t (τ = 0, w =  w 0, t |  V t (τ, w))
 Perceived Returns to Effort =  q t (τ = 1, w = 0 |  V t (τ, w))
 −  q t (τ = 1, w =  w 0, t |  V t (τ, w)).
32 Note that, unlike blind selective trials, identification here does not rely on identification at infinity (see foot-
note 27).
1301CHASSANg ET AL .: SELECTIVE TRIALSVOL. 102 NO. 4
Note that if perceived returns to effort are low, this can indicate that an agent plans 
to expend little or no effort using the technology. The principal can use this informa-
tion in deciding which agents’ usage to monitor more closely.
The monetary equivalent of the cost of an agent’s optimal effort can be obtained 
by rearranging equation (2):
c( e * (τ, w = 0, t)) − c( e * (τ, w =  w 0, t , t)) = − w 0, t ×  q t (τ,  e * (τ, w = 0, t))
 − [ V t (τ, w = 0) −  V t (τ, w =  w 0, t )].
Note that all parameters on the right-hand side are identified from data, except per-
haps  w 0, t .
Identifying the costs incurred by agents can improve inference by allowing the 
principal to distinguish—among agents who believe that appropriate effort has high 
returns—those who believe that only a small amount of effort is sufficient to obtain 
high returns from those who believe that a significant amount of effort is necessary 
to obtain high returns.
Identifying the Full Insurance Contract.—One drawback of incentivized trials is 
that they rely on identifying the full insurance contract  w 0, t , which may depend on 
the agent’s type. However,  w 0, t can be identified from preference information under 
mild assumptions.
FACT 3: Assume that outcome y = 1 yields strictly greater utility than y = 0, that is, 
u( y = 1, t) > u( y = 0, t), and an agent perceives treatment to be beneficial:
∀ e 0 ∈ E, ∃e1 ∈ E s.t. c(e1, t) ≤ c(e0, t) and qt (τ = 0, e0) < qt (τ = 1, e1).
 Then,  w 0, t = max {w |  V t (τ = 1, w) =  V t (τ = 0, w)}.
In words, when treatment facilitates success, the full insurance transfer  w 0, t is the 
highest transfer such that an agent places no value on obtaining treatment. Note 
that the assumptions in Fact 3 rule out cases where an agent believes treatment 
reduces the likelihood of success, as well as environments where an agent values 
treatment only for reasons other than its impact on the principal’s outcome of inter-
est. Whenever the assumptions of Fact 3 do not hold,  w 0, t must be calibrated from 
alternative data, for example, the expected amount of wages lost when sick. This is 
a delicate task, and estimates of  w 0, t are likely to be noisy. The corresponding insur-
ance contract would not induce no effort, but rather a small, and slightly uncertain, 
level of effort. Hence, whenever the full insurance contract  w 0, t is estimated with 
noise, this leads to noisy estimates of treatment effects.
VI. Discussion
This paper studies inference and external validity when experimental subjects 
take unobserved decisions that can affect outcomes. As effort expenditure is driven 
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by beliefs, and beliefs can respond to information, the returns measured by an RCT 
may not be representative of the returns a better-informed population would obtain.
We take a principal-agent approach to trial design, where the principal maximizes 
the informativeness of data. This leads us to study selective trials, which improve 
on RCTs by allowing agents to express preferences over treatments of varying rich-
ness. We show that selective trials can identify whether agents’ beliefs are reducing 
measured treatment effects, as well as separate the returns from treatment, effort, 
and their interaction.
More generally, this paper advocates a mechanism design approach to random-
ized controlled experiments, an approach we believe can help build bridges between 
reduced-form methods—largely concerned with robustness and internal valid-
ity—and structural methods—that use models to identify deep parameters needed 
for external validity. While we believe this research agenda can yield many useful 
applications, successfully implementing its insights requires overcoming a number 
of practical difficulties. In the remainder of this section we discuss some of these 
implementation challenges and directions for future work.
A. Implementation Issues
In theory, the selective trials described in this paper are robust and require no 
specific knowledge on the part of the principal. Our results are obtained under three 
important sets of assumptions, however, that may not hold in practice.
Behavioral Assumptions.—The correct elicitation of preferences, which is key to our 
analysis, relies strongly on the assumption that agents are rational. As people often fail 
to play dominant strategies, however, BDM-like mechanisms only provide a noisy sig-
nal of the agents’ underlying valuations (Keller, Segal, and Wang 1993; Bohm, Lindén, 
and Sonnegård 1997). This suggests that running even relatively simple open selective 
trials, let alone full-fledged blind or incentivized selective trials, will be challenging.
Agents may also be subject to other behavioral biases that are not taken into 
account by our framework.33 A specific concern is that the act of making choices 
may change agents’ preferences. For example, it is possible that an agent who 
expresses a strong desire for, but does not receive, treatment may attempt to obtain 
treatment by other means, but would not do so if his valuation was never elicited.34 
Another concern is that agents may try to infer the value of treatment from the prin-
cipal’s choice of experimental design. For example, similar to Milgrom and Roberts 
(1986), if treatment is only available at a high cost, agents may infer that the tech-
nology is valuable. In these environments, a principal should take into account how 
experimental design influences behavior before drawing inferences.35
Ultimately, we believe the best way to address these concerns is through care-
ful and extensive experimentation, blending both laboratory and field work. As 
33 For instance, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, or even social preferences may play a significant role. A dif-
ferent bias might come from the psychological cost of parting from any amount of money (Cohen and Dupas 2010; 
Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro 2010).
34 A simple way to test for this is to construct a second control group that is never asked to express preferences.
35 For example, the design itself could be considered as part of the experimental treatment. This implies the prin-
cipal should compare agents whose preferences are the same, but have been elicited using different mechanisms.
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laboratory experiments allow the observation of underlying fundamentals, they are 
essential to understand which implementations of selective trials produce more reli-
able data, and what the relevant biases may be. In turn, field experiments—in simple 
environments where actual behavior is observable, and trustworthy surveys may be 
conducted—are needed to check that the insights gathered from the laboratory apply 
in more realistic settings. We anticipate that appropriate implementations should 
give agents multiple opportunities to learn how the relevant mechanism works 
before they actually express preferences over treatment (Plott and Zeiler 2005). 
Additionally, it may be preferable to use mechanisms that elicit coarse information 
about preferences, but impose a smaller cognitive burden on agents.36
Finally, even if our behavioral assumptions are wrong, the data generated still 
enrich that obtained through an RCT. Although this invalidates the interpretation 
of the data put forth in this paper, it does not preclude a more standard analysis 
focusing on average treatment effects, or a more sophisticated analysis taking into 
account relevant biases.
Sample Size.—Large samples are likely to be necessary in order to realize the 
full value of the additional data our mechanisms elicit. Note that the difficulty is 
not with the data collection process, as the correct elicitation of preferences relies 
only on rationality. Rather, sample size restricts the ability to compute meaning-
ful estimates of treatment effects conditional on preferences. This issue is inherent 
to any nonparametric estimation of treatment effects conditional on a rich set of 
explanatory variables, and existing methodologies apply (see, for instance, Pagan 
and Ullah 1999). Given sufficiently large samples, a kernel regression may be prac-
tical. In small samples, it may be necessary to bin agents with similar preferences. 
Alternatively, it may be informative to estimate parametric relationships between 
treatment effects and preference data.37
Cash Constraints.—Eliciting preferences using monetary trade-offs is impractical 
in the presence of severe cash constraints. When only agents are cash constrained, 
a possible, but expensive, solution is to give agents a show-up fee that they can use 
to express preferences.
More fundamentally, monetary trade-offs may be uninformative of intended 
behavior in environments where there is sizable heterogeneity in the marginal 
value of income. For example, Cohen and Dupas (2010) finds that willingness to 
pay for bednets in Kenya is a poor predictor of actual use.38 In that setting, other 
trade-offs—such as willingness to wait, willingness to perform tedious tasks, or 
willingness to return at a later time—may be more informative of agents’ intended 
behavior. The choice of the relevant trade-off is an important degree of freedom that 
can and should be guided by local knowledge.
36 In the case of open selective trials, one may elicit the agent’s preferences over only a few lotteries—see 
Appendix Section II for a discussion. In the case of blind selective trials, one may elicit  V t (ϕ) at a few values of ϕ 
and exploit the fact that  V t (ϕ) is convex to fit simple functional forms.
37 Note that controlling for preferences may reduce the heterogeneity of treatment effects within each bin. This 
may alleviate statistical power concerns.
38 Note that this is not always the case. Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro (2010) documents the opposite finding for 
water treatment products in Zambia.
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In general, it is clear that implementing the ideas advocated in this paper entails 
complex experimental designs, and the details of an individual experiment may need 
to be fine tuned with careful, context-dependent, pilot projects. We are encouraged, 
however, by recent field experiments showing that complex designs can be suc-
cessfully implemented (see Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro 2010; Karlan and Zinman 
2009; and particularly Berry, Fischer, and Guiteras 2012, which implements a BDM 
mechanism in the field). Thus, despite the significant caveats detailed in this section, 
we are hopeful that our approach will prove useful in guiding future field work.
B. Theoretical Extensions
Our approach also suggests directions for further theoretical work. We believe 
these extensions are sufficiently interesting in their own right to deserve indepen-
dent analyses. We outline two of these extensions, specifying both the challenges 
they pose and their potential value added.
Extension to Dynamic Mechanisms.—While our framework can accommodate 
learning and dynamic effort expenditure by agents, we focus on mechanisms that 
elicit agents’ preferences only once. This is a significant restriction, as identifying 
whether, and how, agents change their behavior over time is an important input 
in the analysis of treatment effects (Philipson and Desimone 1997; Philipson and 
Hedges 1998; Scharfstein, Rotnitzky, and Robins 1999; Chan and Hamilton 2006). 
The timing of elicitation is a free design variable, however. In particular, it may 
occur before or after an agent has been exposed to the technology.
For concreteness, consider a technology that requires sustained effort to yield 
returns: for example, antidepressants with delayed effects, technologies exhibiting 
significant learning-by-doing, and so on. Eliciting how preferences change over 
time would improve inference by helping to distinguish agents exhibiting consistent 
motivation throughout the trial from agents whose motivation drops in the mid-
dle. The difficulty is that eliciting preferences in the future necessarily changes an 
agent’s beliefs about future treatment status, and, in turn, changes current effort 
expenditure. In particular, if an agent is promised treatment in future periods to 
induce a particular effort level today, then it becomes impossible to elicit prefer-
ences in the future without breaking this promise.39
Extension to Multiagent Mechanisms.—The mechanisms considered in this paper 
are all single-agent mechanisms—an agent’s assignment depends only on the mes-
sage he sends and not on the messages sent by other agents. This allows us to iden-
tify an agent’s preferences, and thus his beliefs about his own returns to treatment 
and to effort. Considering multiagent mechanisms, in which assignment depends on 
the messages sent by others, can allow us to identify an agent’s beliefs about other 
agents’ values, other agents’ success rates, and so on.
39 In the context of labor market experiments, Abbring and Van den Berg (2003, 2005) makes a similar point: if 
expectations of potential access to treatment change ex ante behavior (for example, investment in human capital), 
then treatment effects are not identified.
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The information elicited by multiagent mechanisms may be useful if there are 
externalities between agents, as in Miguel and Kremer (2004), or to investigate 
social learning. For example, if we observe that most agents have low value for 
the technology, but believe that others have high value for the technology, this sug-
gests a specific failure of social learning, and provides us with the means to correct 
it. Indeed, if most agents do not expend effort using the technology, but believe 
others do, then they will interpret each other’s poor outcomes as a signal that even 
with high effort, the technology does not yield returns. Providing the agents with 
actual data on others’ willingness to pay corrects these inference mistakes and may 
increase experimentation.
Appendix
I. Extensions
A. general Outcome Space
Most of the results extend directly to the case where y takes values in a general 
outcome space Y, and is distributed according to some density function  f y (R, τ, e, t). 
We denote by  f y, t (τ, e) ≡  ∫R   f y (R, τ, e, t) d t(R) the subjective distribution of returns 
from the perspective of an agent of type t. Values go from being sums of two 
terms to being integrals, and incentive contracts are now functions w : Y → 핉. We 
have that
  V t =  max 
e∈E  ∫ y   u( y, t)  f y, t (τ = 1, e) d y − c(e, t)
  V t (ϕ) =  max 
e∈E ϕ ∫ y   u( y, t)  f y, t (τ = 1, e) d y 
  + (1 − ϕ) ∫ 
y
 
 u ( y, t)  f y, t (τ = 0, e) d y − c(e, t)
  V t (τ, w) =  max 
e∈E  ∫ y   [ u( y, t) + w( y)]  f y, t (τ, e) d y − c(e, t).
Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 extend directly with these generalized value func-
tions. Propositions 6 and 7, which identify subjective returns to treatment and effort, 
differ as follows. As we have that
 ∀  y 0 ,   ∂  V t (τ, w) _∂ w( y 0 )  =  f y, t (τ,  e * (τ, w, t))( y 0 ),
Proposition 7 extends directly.
Proposition 6, which deals with blind trials, is more difficult to extend, as now we 
have only a one-dimensional instrument, ϕ ∈ [0, 1], to identify an entire function  f y, t 
rather than the single parameter  q t . We now identify
(A1)  ∂  V t (ϕ) _∂ ϕ  =  ∫ y   u( y, t)[  f y, t (τ = 1,  e * (ϕ, t))( y) −  f y, t (τ = 0,  e * (ϕ, t))( y)] d y,
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which corresponds to a utility weighted subjective treatment effect given subjec-
tively appropriate effort under belief ϕ.
B. Eliciting Preferences under Nonquasilinear Utility
The approach developed in this paper largely extends to the case where prefer-
ences are not quasilinear, although we must consider slightly different mechanisms. 
We now consider utility taking the form u(y, e, p, t) where y ∈ Y, e ∈ E, p ∈ P is now 
a prize (that is, a bundle of goods which may or may not include monetary trans-
fers), and t is the agent’s type. We focus on the case where there exists an unambigu-
ously most desirable prize  
_ p ∈ P, and an unambiguously least desirable prize,  p _ ∈ P.
In the case of open trials, indirect preferences take the following form:
  V t (τ, p) =  max e  ∫ y   u (y, e, p, t)  f y, t (τ, e) d y.
Say we want to elicit preference over (τ, p) ∈ {0, 1} × P. We assume for sim-
plicity that for all such (τ, p),  V t (τ = 0,  p _) ≤  V t (τ, p) ≤  V t  (τ = 1,  _ p). We nor-
malize  V t (τ = 0, p =  p _) = 0 and  V t (τ = 1, p =  _ p) = 1. Consider the following 
generalization of the BDM mechanism: an agent sends a message m ∈  핉 {0, 1}×P , 
which corresponds to a value function; the principal randomly picks (τ, p, λ) from 
some continuous distribution over {0, 1} × P × [0, 1]; an agent is assigned (τ, p) if 
m(τ, p) > λ and the lottery λ × (τ = 1, p =  _ p) + (1 − λ) × (τ = 0, p =  p _) other-
wise. In this setting it is dominant for an agent to send message m =  V t . Similar 
mechanisms allow us to identify indirect preferences in the case of blind and incen-
tivized trials.
Propositions 1, 3, 4, and 5 extend directly with these generalized value functions. 
Again, extending Propositions 6 and 7 requires some more work. Proposition 6—
which identifies subjective returns to effort using blind trials—extends as is when 
y ∈ {0, 1}, and extends according to (A1) when y takes values in a general outcome 
set Y. Proposition 7 extends as is when preferences are separable in prize p; that 
is, when u( y, e, p, t) =  u 0 ( y, e, t) −  u 1 ( p, t). When preferences are not separable in 
prize p, incentivized trials allow us to identify  f y, t ( y)  ∂ u _ ∂ w( y)  |  y, p for all values of y 
and p. Note that when preferences are separable, the multiplicative constant can be 
identified from the fact that probabilities sum to 1.
II. Implementation
A. Implementing Open Selective Trials as a Finite Menu of Lotteries
The mechanisms described in the paper all use a continuum of messages and elicit 
the agent’s exact willingness to pay. Of course, it is possible to use simpler mecha-
nisms to elicit coarser information. This example shows how to identify which of N 
intervals an agent’s willingness to pay belongs to.
The principal chooses value thresholds −  V max =  V 0 <  V 1 < ⋯ <  V N =  V max . 
She can elicit the interval where an agent’s value lies by offering a menu of lot-
teries. This menu is constructed with messages M = {1, … , N } and any increasing 
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sequence π(1) < π(2) < ⋯ < π(N ) of sampling rates. Thus, message m ∈ M cor-
responds to buying the lottery that delivers treatment with probability π(m). In order 
to match these messages with the appropriate value interval, the principal simply 
sets p(m), the price of lottery m, according to
(B1) ∀k > 1,  p(k) = p(k − 1) + (π(k) − π(k − 1)) V k−1 .
Note that the sequence of prices is entirely determined by p(1). Denote by  g π, p the 
mechanism corresponding to this menu of lotteries, then
FACT 4: Under mechanism  g π, p an agent of type t sends message k if and only if 
 V t ∈ [ V k−1 ,  V k ].
This emphasizes the many degrees of freedom the principal has when implement-
ing selective trials as menus of lotteries. The value intervals according to which 
agents are classified, and the rates according to which they obtain treatment, are, to 
a large extent, free parameters. The only restriction is that sampling rates must be 
increasing in an agent’s value (Proposition 2).
B. Implementing Incentivized Selective Trials
This section complements Section V by describing how to implement incentiv-
ized selective trials as an extension of the BDM mechanism. Let the message space 
M be the set of (normalized) possible utility functions  V t (τ, w):
 M = {m ∈  핉 {0,1}×핉 s.t. m(0, 0) = 0}.
Let  F τ, w be a full-support probability distribution over {0, 1} × 핉 and let ( F p | τ, w ) (τ, w)∈{0,1}×핉 denote a set of full-support conditional probability distributions 
over p ∈ 핉. The mechanism is run as follows: the agent submits a utility function  m i . 
A pair ( τ i ,  w i ) and a price  p i are drawn according to  F τ,w and  F p |  τ i , w i  . If  p i ≤  m i ( τ i ,  w i ), 
then the agent is given allocation ( τ i ,  w i ) and pays  p i . If  p i >  m i ( τ i ,  w i ), the agent is 
assigned (0, 0) and makes no transfers. Because  F τ,w as well as  F p | τ,w have full support, 
it is optimal for an agent to send message  m i (t) =  V t (τ, w). In turn, a mechanism is a 
most informative incentivized trial if and only if: (i) it elicits value function  V t (τ, w), 
and (ii), for any message m, the induced distribution over (τ, w) ∈ {0, 1} × 핉 has 
full support.
Note that instead of eliciting preferences over a continuous domain {0, 1} × 핉, the 
same methodology can be used to elicit preferences over a finite grid. The distribu-
tion  F τ,w then needs to have full support with respect to the grid of interest.
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